This paper deals with a situation where the prior distribution in a Bayesian treatment of a Bernoulli experiment is not known precisely. Imprecision for Bernoulli experiments is discussed for the case where the prior densities are defined in the form of intervals of measures, and a simple model with conjugate imprecise prior densities is used for ease of calculation in case of updating. Attention is focussed on imprecision with regard to predictive probabilities.
Introduction
We consider a standard Bernoulli situation. Independent random variables X. (i=l, 2, .. ) with identical binomial probability mass functions, p(xi=xln) = n X (l-n) 1-x, are sampled (x=O or 1 and O~n~l) . We refer to the observation of a number, say k, of the independent random variables X, as a Bernoulli experiment (if k=l, the experiment is also called a trial). An observation of X, with value 1 is called a success and an observation with value 0 a failure. Let X be the number of successes in an experiment of size k (ke~predetermined), then the distribution of X is the binomial:
px(x=xln) = (~)nx(l_n)k-X, for xe{O,l, .. ,k} and O~n~l, denoted by X-Bin(k,n) .
We are interested in the probability of a success in a future trial, or, more generally, in the probability of x successes in a future experiment of size k. Inferences must be based on the available information, which can consist of historical data (results of past experiments) and opinions (subjective data) . Walley (1991) in an extensive discussion shows that the amount of information available should be reported in a model by means of a concept of imprecision (or precision). The more information one has, the more precise statements can be made, even about events under uncertainty (unless new information is contradictory to old information) .
We use the concept of imprecise probabilities (Walley (1991» with lower and upper probabilities denoted by P and P respectively, following axioms derived by Smith (1961) {see also Wolfenson and Fine (1982) }.
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In this paper, inferences for the parameter n of a Bernoulli process are discussed within the Bayesian framework using imprecise prior densities for n in the form of intervals of measures (DeRobertis and Hartigan (1981». We do not discuss elicitation here, but remark that assessment of such intervals of measures is more suitable for practical application than assessment of a single prior distribution (Walley (1991, ch.4». In section 2 of this paper a short literature survey is given, discussing both precise and imprecise models. In section 3 a statistical model based on imprecise probabilities is proposed, in which conjugate imprecise prior densities are used to simplify calculation, and imprecision for a Bernoulli trial is discussed.
In section 4 the behaviour of the model is discussed for experiments of size k, again with an emphasis on imprecision.
Finally, in section 5 we discuss lack of prior knowledge and give an example of possible practical application.
Survey of the Literature

Precise Models
If the parameter n is regarded as a random variable, the density of a conjugate prior distribution is a beta (Colombo and Constantini (1980» a-I~-1 g (p)~P (l-p) for O~p~l (a,~>O). We n write n-Be(a,~). If an experiment of size n leads to s successes this prior can be updated giving a posterior n-Be(a+s,~+n-s). We summarise the data as (n,s). Lee (1989, ch.3) shows that any 3 reasonably smooth unimodal distribution on [0,1] can be well approximated by some beta distribution.
The predictive distribution for X, corresponding to the conjugate prior, is a Polya distribution, X-pol(k,a,~), also called a beta-binomial distribution (Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) ), with probability mass function Px(X=x) = (~)B(a+x,~+k-X)JB(a,~) for xelO,1, .. ,kl, with B the beta function. On updating (a,~) is replaced by (a+s,~+n-s).
Many priors have been proposed to represent total lack of knowledge (Walley (1991, section 5.5.2) (Haldane (1945) , Novick and Hall (1965) , Jaynes (1968) and Villegas (1977) ). Priors that do not belong to the beta family have also been proposed (Zellner (1977) ). Other interesting contributions are Lindley and Phillips (1976) and Geisser (1984) . Press (1989) extensively discusses Bayesian analysis for the binomial distribution, with n both discrete and continuous.
Bayesian analysis with discrete n is disregarded here, as it is of little practical interest.
The fact that authors do not agree about a 'noninformative' prior distribution indicates that none of the priors has all properties required to model ignorance (there is even no agreement about a criterion for ignorance within the usual concept of precise probability). Further, each prior distribution leads to a single predictive distribution, this does not represent the lack of knowledge. For example, all prior distributions that are symmetric around 0.5 (e.g. n-Be(a,a) for every a) lead, for k=l, to predictive probability mass function P (X=O)=P (X=1)=1/2. It is X X remarkable that, within the standard Bayesian framework an optimal decision is almost always obtained, even if one has tried to use no information at all.
Imprecise Models
A full overview is given by Walley (1991) , so we restrict ourselves to a short survey. The idea of imprecise probabilities goes back to Boole (1854) . For more than a hundred years little attention was paid to the subject until the early sixties when Smith (1961) and Good (1962) provided important contributions to the theory. Dempster (1968) proposed a theory that has been shown to fail in some cases (Walley (1991, section 5.13) ). The method of DeRobertis and Hartigan (1981) , 'intervals of measures', is especially useful when imprecise probabilities are used for parameters, as in the Bayesian framework (see Pericchi and Walley (1991) ). The method of DeRobertis and Hartigan is adopted here. We regard imprecision to be the essential concept in reporting an amount of information, it is in this way that our method differs from the sensitivity approach and robust Bayesian analysis (Berger (1985) , Berger and Berliner (1986) , Lavine (1991a,b) , Moreno and Cano (1991) ).
The problem of inference for Bernoulli trials was discussed by Walley (1991, chapter 5) , but his suggested method is less general than here, as the set of prior densities consists only of beta densities. Our method, following DeRobertis. and Hartigan (1981) , defines bounds for prior densities, and depends less on an assumed parametric model. Walley (1991) restricts himself to a set of beta densities, which is out of tune with his overall approach.
We adopt Walley's interpretation of imprecise probabilities in terms of betting behaviour (see also Smith (1961) and de Finetti (1974) ) .
For an event of interest, say A, with lower probability P(A) and upper probability P(A), imprecision is defined as 3. Modelling Imprecision
The Model
Following the method of intervals of measures, proposed by DeRobertis and Hartigan (1981) , imprecise prior densities can be chosen such that a conjugacy property holds. To achieve this let 
with ;\>0 and /-l>0, and CO~O. Here we emphasize imprecision and updating.
Lower and upper prior predictive probability mass functions are (x=O,l, .. ,k):
(~)B(<<+X,~+k-X)jB(<<,~) and
respectively.
Corresponding imprecise probabilities for the event X=x are
If data (n,s) become available, the imprecise prior densities are updated to imprecise posterior densities ul [(pln,s) al [(pln,s) t ( 
Corresponding to the prior densities t and U (and analogously to
posterior densities) for l[ are, respectively, lower and upper cumulative distribution functions (cdf, see Walley (1991, ch. 4» The imprecision corresponding to these imprecise cdf's for n~p is Next we discuss briefly some earlier results on the imprecision for n~p, and then the imprecision for X corresponding to imprecise predictive probabilities. fJ.x(x=Oln,s) = px(x=Oln,s) -~x(x=Oln,s)
The prior imprecision for X=O is g:
a =~I I I s2 = n/2 s: 0 n/2 n II.
a <~0<sl<n/2<s2
g:
g: 
Secondly, it is worth remarking that data contradictory to the prior ideas increase the imprecision if n is small, but a large n can also make the imprecision decrease (as shown by the role of S2). Such behaviour seems to be natural, and is called prior-data conflict (Walley (1991, section 5.4» .
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The behaviour of imprecision around sl is also remarkable, but easily explained within the model by considering the behaviour of x as function of~and~. It is more interesting to discuss this behaviour from an intuitive point of view. Here the idea is that, if the updated densities are further away from n=1/2 than the priors are, imprecision decreases. If we feel, after we have got new data, that n will probably be closer to the nearest extreme value (O or 1) than we thought before, imprecision for the probability of success at the next trial decreases.
The concept of imprecision is important as it corresponds to the amount of information available on which to base subjective statements. An even better interpretation is as the value of the information available to us, with regard to the way in which it changes our ideas about the event of interest. Thus imprecision is the correct tool to report the amount of information. This generalization of the standard theory of probability is necessary to accommodate this point of view.
The effect of new data can be divided in two parts. First, some important aspects of the data, e.g. mean value (these aspects are often summarized by sufficient statistics), have influence on our thoughts. Secondly, the amount of data is important, and this aspect was not taken into consideration by the simple model for k=l discussed above, but it has been remarked that this could be 
Imprecision for the Binomial Model
For experiments of size k, the above model leads to imprecise prior predictive cdf's (x=O,I, .. ,k): can be interpreted as the loss of imprecision, or the gain of information about the event X~x. The imprecision of the event X=x, X(x=x), depends analogously on~. So for larger~the gain of information from data is less than for smaller~(this gain of information might be negative) .
To show the behaviour of imprecision within this model an example is used.
Example 4.1
In In this discussion we consider only imprecision for X=x, but it is also interesting to study imprecision for XSx from table 4.1. For the prior, the maximum imprecision is~x ( -x
x + 1 11 + and F X (x) (Co +1) (x+1) 11 + Co (x+1) .
It is easy to see that Co can be chosen such that P (X=x) and -x Px(x=X) are arbitrarily close to 0 or 1, although 0 and 1 cannot be adopted for finite cO. This can also be done for all F (x) and -x FX(X)' where it should be remarked that F (10) = F (10) 1.
-x X As a practical example of where this can be used, suppose that there are 10 identical machines and the object of interest is the number X of these machines that will operate for one month without breakdown, while nothing at all is known about these machines. A possible choice to model this prior lack of information is to define Co such that~x(x=x)~O.Ol and Px(x=x)~0.99. These constraints hold for c O =1000, so this value is adopted.
Suppose that the first month 8 of these 10 machines operated successfully (and there is no wearout). Then your prior opinions can be updated. The parameters~and Co should already be chosen, to indicate the value you assign to new data, compared to your prior knowledge. Remember that~can be interpreted as the number of data that gives you an equal amount of information as you had before, so it is logical to choose~very small. In The relative difference in the amount of information has changed very little after updating. 
